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TOWARD A THEORY OF "JUST CAUSE" IN
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE CASES*
ROGER I. ABRAMS** AND DENNIS R. NOLAN***
Although almost every collective bargaining agreement permits the
employer to discipline an employee for "just cause," the concept ofjust
cause is not well understood. Rather than leading to fair and consistent
resolutions of disciplinary disputes, the concept, as applied in arbitration
proceedings, has led to inconsistent results that fail to serve the interests
of either management or labor. This article develops a systematic theory
ofjust cause in employee discipline cases by exploring the fundamental
understanding of the employment relationship and the effect of the col-
lective bargaining agreement on the fundamental understanding. It
presents a model of just cause, identifying the components of the em-
ployee's obligation to provide satisfactory work, management's objectives
for imposing discipline, and the union's objective of achieving fairness in
discipline administration. By illustrating the application of the theory,
the article demonstrates the value of a principled approach to just
cause-employers and employees can better shape their day-to-day con-
duct, and arbitrators can more consistently honor the expectations of the
parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Just cause" for discipline is the most important principle of labor
relations in the unionized firm. Few things are more significant to em-
ployees than limitations on their employer's power to discipline or dis-
charge them. Virtually every collective bargaining agreement contains
some such limitations, by far the most common of which is the require-
ment that there be "just cause" for discipline.' This requirement is so
well accepted that often it is found to be implicit in the collective agree-
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1. In its survey of major collective bargaining agreements, the Bureau of National Affairs
reported in 1983 that 94% of the agreements reviewed contained a "just cause" or "cause" provi-
sion. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 40:1 (1983).
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ment, even when there is no stated limitation on the employer's power to
discipline.2 However, while the just cause standard is well accepted and
is commonly an express part of the agreement, the parties seldom define
the term in any detail.
Collective bargaining agreements typically provide for arbitration of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the contract. As
a result, arbitrators are routinely required to apply the just cause stan-
dard in order to evaluate the propriety of disciplinary action. Cases in-
volving disciplinary action constitute the largest category of disputes
brought to arbitration, accounting for two-fifths of the total.3 In light of
the importance of the just cause standard to labor and management, and
the frequency with which arbitrators must apply it, it is surprising that
little has been written on the subject. 4
Just cause is hardly an obvious concept. When applying it to spe-
cific cases, arbitrators tend to define just cause in nebulous terms or to
make conclusory statements. For example, "reasonable" discipline is
permissible,5 but "arbitrary," "excessive," or "discriminatory" discipline
is not.6 A penalty that does not "shock the conscience" of the arbitrator
is upheld, 7 but one that is not "just" under "all the circumstances" is set
aside.8 In fact, one arbitrator characterized the term "just cause" as
"purposefully ambiguous." 9 Although some arbitrators have identified
various procedural prerequisites for just cause, even they have failed to
2. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 621, 624 (1983) (Sabo, Arb.); Corn Belt Elec.
Coop., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1045, 1049 (1982) (O'Grady, Arb.); Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 295, 300-01 (1955) (Boles, Arb.).
3. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service reports that approximately 40% of the
cases it administered over the 10 year period 1972-1981 involved discharge or disciplinary matters.
34 FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT 40-41 (1981).
4. A useful work for the practitioner is James R. Redeker's recent book, DISCIPLINE: POLI-
CIES AND PROCEDURES (1983). Jean T. McKelvey's chapter on "Discipline and Discharge," in
ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 88 (A. Zack ed. 1984), also provides insight into the area. Articles on
various types of discipline cases have appeared recently in the Arbitration Journal, published by the
American Arbitration Association. See, eg., Cramer, Arbitration and Mental Illness: The Issues, the
Rationale, and the Remedies, 35 ARB. J., Sept. 1980, at 10; Marmo, Arbitrating Sex Harassment
Cases, 35 ARB. J., Mar. 1980, at 35; Wynns, Arbitration Standards in Drug Discharge Cases, 34 ARB.
J., June 1979, at 19.
5. See 3 M Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 926, 928 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.); Napoleon Bd. of
Educ., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 303, 305 (1980) (Roumell, Arb.); Riley Stoker Corp., 7 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 764, 768 (1947) (Platt, Arb.).
6. See United States Sugar Corp., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 604, 609 (1984) (Hanes, Arb.); Kansas
City Area Transp. Auth., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 409, 413 (1984) (Maniscalco, Arb.); Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 484, 487 (1977) (Sisk, Arb.).
7. See Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 880, 883 (1984) (Schedler, Arb.).
8. See City of Kalamazoo, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138, 140-41 (1983) (Ellmann, Arb.).
9. Municipality of Anchorage, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 256, 263 (1983) (Hauck, Arb.).
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base their proposals on a comprehensive theory of employee discipline.t0
Leaving the determination of just cause to the discretion of effec-
tively unreviewable arbitrators11 leads to inexplicable results. An em-
ployee whose comments to a client were only "vulgar" and "offensive,"
and not "obscene" or "prurient," should not have been discharged, but
only suspended without pay for six months.12 Discharge was too severe
for an employee who, in order to pad his paycheck, intentionally per-
formed unnecessary work, because his act was not "malicious." ' 13 Such
decisions fail to serve the interests of either management or labor. They
provide neither guidance for future conduct nor persuasive rationales. A
systematic model of just cause is thus needed to guide employers and
employees in their day-to-day conduct and to assist arbitrators in resolv-
ing disciplinary disputes.
This article is a preliminary effort toward the development of a the-
ory of just cause. The article begins by describing the "fundamental un-
derstanding" that forms the basis of every individual hiring.' 4 It then
explains how unions ratify and amend this fundamental understanding in
collective bargaining agreements, most importantly by adopting the just
cause standard for discipline.15 The next two sections of the article de-
scribe the interests of management and labor in disciplinary disputes and
suggest how those interests are reflected in the concept of just cause.' 6
The article then states a theory of just cause that is consistent with the
fundamental understanding, the collective bargaining process, and the le-
gitimate interests of both parties.' 7 The final portion of the article illus-
trates the application of the theory. 18 An examination of some typical
cases demonstrates that most arbitration awards, when properly under-
stood, are consistent with our theory of just cause and reflect the implicit
acceptance of that theory by labor arbitrators.
10. See infra note 30.
11. The Supreme Court severely limited the authority of courts to review labor arbitration
awards in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Nolan &
Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 557, 590-91 (1983).
12. See City of Rochester, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 217, 220 (1984) (Lawson, Arb.). Cf City of
Sterling Heights, 3 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (84 Lab. Arb.) 363, 366 (Feb. 13, 1985) (Keefe, Arb.)
("lewd occurrence" and "bacchanal" in the women's bathroom sufficient to support discharge).
13. See Ellwell-Parker Elec. Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 327, 335 (1984) (Dworkin, Arb.).
14. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying note 66.
18. See infra notes 67-105 and accompanying text.
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II. THE FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING
When a homeowner hires a neighborhood teenager to mow the
lawn, there is little formality in the transaction. The two may discuss
wages and hours, but only in a rudimentary way. Few other details are
likely to receive even that much attention. When a factory personnel
manager hires a machinist, the discussion may last a bit longer, but it is
still likely to be limited to basic information about the work required and
the benefits offered. Little discussion is needed because all hirings are
premised upon a common understanding of the parties' interests. This
understanding is fundamental to the very nature of the employment rela-
tionship. A potential employer is willing to part with his money only in
return for something he values more highly, the time and satisfactory
work of the employee. The potential employee will part with his time
and work only for something he values more, the money offered by the
employer. Each is, to some degree, aware of the other's interests.1 9
This fundamental understanding of the employment relationship
can be easily summarized: both parties realize that the employer must
pay the agreed wages and benefits and that the employee must do "satis-
factory" work. "Satisfactory" work, in this context, has four elements:
(1) regular attendance, (2) obedience to reasonable work rules, (3) a rea-
sonable quantity and quality of work, and (4) avoidance of any conduct
that would interfere with the employer's ability to operate the business
successfully. 20 The common phrase, "a fair day's work for a fair day's
pay," attempts to capture the essence of this understanding. While the
fundamental understanding is so limited as barely to constitute a bargain,
it does provide the framework for the employment relationship.2
As limited as it is, the fundamental understanding may appear to be
unbalanced. The obligations of the employee seem to be more numerous
and perhaps more onerous than those of the employer. This perception
of unfairness is not always accurate, however. As a matter of economics,
the employee would not undertake his obligations unless he regarded the
wage and benefit level to be fair compensation for his time and effort.
19. See generally N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL
(1948); M. CHANDLER, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND UNION INTERESTS 66-82 (1964); R. HOXIE,
TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 284-85 (1917); O.W. PHELPS, DISCIPLINE AND DIS-
CHARGE IN THE UNIONIZED FIRM (1959); Chamberlain, The Philosophy ofAmerican Management
Toward Labor, in LABOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 171, 181-83 (W. Haber ed. 1966); Young, The
Question of Managerial Prerogatives, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 240, 245-46 (1963).
20. See, e.g., North Am. Aluminum Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1034, 1035 (1983) (Daniel,
Arb.) ("The obligation of an employee is not totally connected with the volume or quantity of his
work but rather also with his observation of the fair and reasonable standards and conditions of
employment."). See generally B. KARSH, DIARY OF A STRIKE 8-11 (1958).
21. See generally J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 285-86 (1968).
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Moreover, when the demand for labor exceeds the available supply-a
situation that existed throughout this country for much of its history and
still exists with regard to certain skills-the employee's obligations will
be reduced and his wages increased.22
True or false, the belief that the fundamental understanding of the
employment relationship is unbalanced is one of the main factors causing
employees to unionize.23 When a union negotiates a collective bargain-
ing agreement, it does so against the background of this fundamental
understanding. Far from repudiating that understanding, collective
agreements always ratify it, sometimes implicitly but usually explicitly.
This occurs for several reasons. First, unions are composed of individual
employees, each of whom understands the nature of the exchange be-
tween employer and employee. Second, unionized employees realize that
the economic health of the employer, a determinant of their continued
employment, depends to some degree on their efficiency. Finally, dili-
gent employees know that "shirkers" simply make work more difficult
for other employees.
A collective agreement incorporates the fundamental understand-
ing, but also provides it with sufficient detail that it properly can be
termed a bargain. The result is likely to be more balanced than the fun-
damental understanding itself. For example, the agreement may care-
fully define the quantity and type of work required, and it almost
certainly will spell out in some detail the benefits employees are to
receive.
For the employees, the most important effect of the collective agree-
ment is the correction of what they perceive to be the major flaw of the
fundamental understanding-the insecurity of the relationship. 24 Be-
cause the fundamental understanding is limited to the exchange of
money for work done, either side may terminate the relationship at
will. 25 This usually presents little problem for employers, but for em-
22. See Dunlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory, in THE THEORY OF WAGE DETER-
MINATnON 3, 26-27 (J. Dunlop ed. 1957).
23. See Kochan, How American Workers View Labor Unions, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Apr.
1979, at 23, 25; see also Ashenfelter & Pencavel, American Trade Union Growth, 1900-1960, 83 Q. J.
ECON. 434, 435-39 (1969); Bakke, Why Workers Join Unions, 22 PERSONNEL 37 (1945); Hammer &
Smith, Work Attitudes as Predictors of Unionization Activity, 63 J. App. PSYCH. 415 (1978).
24. See generally A. FLANDERS, MANAGEMENT AND UNIONS 38-47 (1970).
25. Many courts have recognized implied limitations on an employer's right to terminate the
employment relationship. Examples based on tort theory, often called "public policy exceptions,"
include the employee who is discharged for "whistle blowing," e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 473, 427 A.2d 385, 386 (1980), or for refusing to engage in unlawful activities,
e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172-74, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-34, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 841-43 (1980). An example based on the contract theory of an implied covenant of good
faith is the discharge of an employee for opposing the negotiation of a "sweetheart contract," e.g.,
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ployees with continuing obligations and limited alternatives it can be
devastating. Thus, the main addition to the fundamental understanding
that unions seek in collective agreements is job security. Occasionally
unions achieve this by negotiating an explicit guarantee of work.26 More
frequently, the agreements provide partial job security by instituting a
seniority system.27 More frequently still, the agreement protects job se-
curity by limiting the employer's power to discipline and discharge.28
It is impractical for negotiators to spell out every possible offense
that would allow an employer to discharge or discipline an employee. In
fact, negotiators seldom attempt to include such a comprehensive list in
the agreement. Instead they agree that discipline may be imposed only
for "just cause" or some similar term. The just cause standard is so uni-
versal that arbitrators use it even when the agreement is silent.29 Thus,
the fundamental understanding, as amended in the collective bargaining
agreement, can be stated as follows: employees will provide "satisfac-
tory" work, in return for which the employer will pay the agreed wages
and benefits, and will continue the employment relationship unless there
is just cause to terminate it.
Just cause is obviously not a precise concept. It cannot be applied to
a particular dispute by an employer or an arbitrator without analysis and
the exercise of judgment.30 The concept is so vague, in fact, that it pro-
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 318-19, 328, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919-20, 927
(1981). In the absence of special circumstances, however, an employer may usually discharge an
employee at will. Recent developments regarding the employment-at-will doctrine are discussed in
St. Antoine, The Revision of Employment-at-Will Enters a New Phase, 36 LAB. L.J. 563 (1985);
Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Managerial Considerations, 48 Mo. L.
REV. 855 (1983); Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At-Will
Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983); Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Employment-at-Will
Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 199 (1983); Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Con-
tracts, 1985 DuKE L.J. 196.
26. The Bureau of National Affairs reported that 1 I% of its sample contracts contained clauses
explicitly guaranteeing work or pay in some situations. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 53:1 (1983).
27. The Bureau of National Affairs reported that 89% of its sample contracts contained senior-
ity provisions. Id. § 75:1.
28. See supra note 1.
29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. The best attempt in an arbitration decision to give meaning to "just cause" was by Arbitra-
tor Carroll R. Daugherty in Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 557-59 (1964).
Daugherty formulated a comprehensive but purely procedural scheme for determining just cause.
His often-cited approach is worth quoting in full:
Few if any union-management agreements contain a definition of "just cause." Neverthe-
less, over the years the opinions of arbitrators in innumerable discipline cases have devel-
oped a sort of "common law" definition thereof. This definition consists of a set of guide
lines or criteria that are to be applied to the facts of any one case, and said criteria are set
forth below in the form of questions.
A "no" answer to any one or more of the following questions normally signifies that
just and proper cause did not exist. In other words, such "no" means that the employer's
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duces confusion and inconsistent arbitration awards. There will never be
a simple definition of "just cause," nor even a consensus on its applica-
disciplinary decision contained one or more elements of arbitrary, capricious, unreasona-
ble, and/or discriminatory action to such an extent that said decision constituted an abuse
of managerial discretion warranting the arbitrator to substitute his judgment for that of the
employer.
The answers to the questions in any particular case are to be found in the evidence
presented to the arbitrator at the hearing thereon. Frequently, of course, the facts are such
that the guide lines cannot be applied with slide-rule precision.
1. Did the Company give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possi-
ble or probable disciplinary consequences of the employee's conduct?
Note 1: Said forewarning or foreknowledge may properly have been given orally by
management or in writing through the medium of typed or printed sheets or books of shop
rules and of penalties for violation thereof.
Note 2: There must have been actual oral or written communication of the rules and
penalties to the employee.
Note 3: A finding of lack of such communication does not in all cases require a "no"
answer to Question No. 1. This is because certain offenses such as insubordination, coming
to work intoxicated, drinking intoxicating beverages on the job, or theft of the property of
the company or of fellow employees are so serious that any employee in the industrial
society may properly be expected to know already that such conduct is offensive and heav-
ily punishable.
Note 4: Absent any contractual prohibition or restriction, the company has the right
unilaterally to promulgate reasonable rules and give reasonable orders; and same need not
have been negotiated with the union.
2. Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related to the orderly,
efficient, and safe operation of the capitalized Company's business?
Note: If an employee believes that said rule or order is unreasonable, he must never-
theless obey same (in which case he may file a grievance thereover) unless he sincerely feels
that to obey the rule or order would seriously and immediately jeopardize his personal
safety and/or integrity. Given a firm finding to the latter effect, the employee may properly
be said to have had justification for his disobedience.
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee, make an effort to
discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of
management?
Note 1: This is the employee's "day in court" principle. An employee has the right to
know with reasonable precision the offense with which he is being charged and to defend
his behavior.
Note 2: The company's investigation must normally be made before its disciplinary
decision is made. If the company fails to do so, its failure may not normally be excused on
the ground that the employee will get his day in court through the grievance procedure
after the exaction of discipline. By that time there has usually been too much hardening of
positions.
Note 3: There may of course be circumstances under which management must react
immediately to the employee's behavior. In such cases the normally proper action is to
suspend the employee pending investigation, with the understanding that (a) the final disci-
plinary decision will be made after the investigation and (b) if the employee is found inno-
cent after the investigation, he will be restored to job with full pay for time lost.
4. Was the Company's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
Note: At said investigation the management official may be both "prosecutor" and
"judge," but he may not also be a witness against the employee.
5. At the investigation did the "judge" obtain substantial evidence or proof that the
employee was guilty as charged?
Note: It is not required that the evidence be preponderant, conclusive or "beyond
reasonable doubt." But the evidence must be truly substantial and not flimsy.
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly and without
discrimination to all employees?
Note 1: A "no" answer to this question requires a finding of discrimination and war-
rants negation or modification of the discipline imposed.
Note 2: If the company has been lax in enforcing its rules and orders and decides
henceforth to apply them rigorously, the company may avoid a finding of discrimination by
telling all employees beforehand of its intent to enforce hereafter all rules as written.
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tion to specific cases, but this does not mean the phrase is devoid of
meaning. On the contrary, it is possible to make sense of the term and to
give it substance. This can be done by viewing the just cause standard as
an amended form of the fundamental understanding. Just cause, in other
words, embodies the idea that the employee is entitled to continued em-
ployment, provided he attends work regularly, obeys work rules, per-
forms at some reasonable level of quality and quantity, and refrains from
interfering with his employer's business by his activities on or off the job.
An employee's failure to meet these obligations will justify discipline.
The employer's right to discipline an unsatisfactory employee may be
stated expressly in the contract. Even where the contract is silent, how-
ever, the right is included among the "reserved rights" that management
retains from its pre-union authority. 31
The nature and severity of the employee's offense, among other
things, will determine what form of discipline is appropriate. A small
departure from "satisfactory" work may result in a verbal or written
warning. 32 A more serious or repeated offense may produce a suspension
without pay.3 3 In an extreme case, the employer may be justified in dis-
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular case
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee's proven offense and (b) the record
of the employee in his service with the company?
Note 1: A trivial proven offense does not merit harsh discipline unless the employee
has properly been found guilty of the same or other offenses a number of times in the past.
(There is no rule as to what number of previous offenses constitutes a "good," a "fair," or a
"bad" record. Reasonable judgment thereon must be used.)
Note 2: An employee's record of previous offenses may never be used to discover
whether he was guilty of the immediate or latest one. The only proper use of his record is
to help determine the severity of discipline once he has properly been found guilty of the
immediate offense.
Note 3: Given the same proven offense for two or more employees, their respective
records provide the only proper basis for "discriminating" among them in the administra-
tion of discipline for said offense. Thus, if employee A's record is significantly better than
those of employees B, C, and D, the company may properly give A a lighter punishment
than it gives the others for the same offense: and this does not constitute true discrimina-
tion.
Although Daugherty's effort is commendable, he fails to explain why these procedural questions
need to be answered. His approach lacks a theoretical basis grounded in the interests of manage-
ment and labor in the discipline context. Although this article's theory of just cause raises many of
Daugherty's procedural questions, it also presents an analytical framework for a systematic discus-
sion of the nature of just cause.
31. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 650-51 (4th ed. 1985).
32. See Challenge Mach. Co., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 865, 868 (1983) (Roumell, Arb.); Washing-
ton Hosp. Center, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601, 606 (1983) (Rothschild, Arb.); Wallace-Murray Corp.,
73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 385, 386-87 (1979) (Seifer, Arb.).
33. See Municipal Court, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 463, 464-65 (1983) (Draznin, Arb.); Lash Dis-
trib., Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 274, 277-78 (1980) (Darrow, Arb.); Crosby Group, 72 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 787, 788 (1979) (Davis, Arb.).
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charging an employee. 34 The employee may protest the discipline
through the contractual grievance procedure. If the parties fail to resolve
the grievance, the union may take the case to an impartial arbitrator for
final and binding resolution. The question for the arbitrator is whether
the employee's conduct constituted a sufficiently serious breach of his
obligation under the fundamental understanding to warrant the disci-
pline imposed.
The fundamental understanding forms the very core of just cause.
Management seeks efficient production from its workforce and engages
individual employees to achieve that goal. When an employee fails to
fulfill the employer's reasonable expectations, he breaches his obligations
under the fundamental understanding. On the other hand, when an em-
ployer fires an employee for an illegitimate reason, it breaches its obliga-
tion under the amended version of the fundamental understanding. The
employee's offense and the employer's decision to fire can both be tested
against the just cause standard.
The fundamental understanding, as amended in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, is a useful tool for the development of a theory of just
cause, but further refinements are possible. The arbitrator can better
identify the types of prohibited behavior and the appropriate levels of
discipline by understanding the interests of management and the union in
disciplinary situations.
III. MANAGEMENT'S INTERESTS
Why would management discipline an employee? Whim or preju-
dice explain some disciplinary decisions,35 but such cases are rare. The
profit motive alone discourages arbitrary discipline.36 Wrongful or dis-
proportionate discipline creates employee dissatisfaction, 37 which in turn
makes it more difficult to hire and retain qualified employees. In particu-
lar, wrongful discharge may impose significant costs on an employer,
who must seek out, employ, and train a replacement for the terminated
34. See Care Inns, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 687, 694 (1983) (Taylor, Arb.) (janitor discharged
for sexual assault of nurse's aide); Metropolitan Transit Auth., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 655, 656 (1982)
(Allen, Arb.) (bus driver who shot a motorist was discharged for possessing a gun on bus).
35. See Peterson, Management Efficiency and Collective Bargaining, 1 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 29, 39 (1947) (unorganized workers often have no protection against discipline based on whim
or prejudice).
36. See generally Myers, Concepts of Industrial Discipline, 9 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. ARD. 59, 60
(1956).
37. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT 624 (1960).
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worker.38 The employer's common law authority to suspend or dis-
charge workers at will is thus no indication of his actual willingness to
use that authority in a capricious manner.
Most discipline is imposed for more rational purposes. There are at
least three possible motivations for employee discipline: (1) rehabilita-
tion, (2) deterrence, which may be either specific or general, and (3) pro-
tection of profitability. Rehabilitation is the most obvious objective. An
employee who seems to be developing poor work habits, such as absen-
teeism or carelessness, may, as the result of disciplinary prodding, be-
come fully satisfactory. Perhaps the employee's mistakes stemmed from
some correctable personal problem or a lack of awareness as to their seri-
ousness. By applying discipline in gradually increasing doses, the em-
ployer might impress upon the employee the need for change. The
objective is to cure a specific problem and make the employee's work
satisfactory.3 9
Specific deterrence is closely related to rehabilitation. The em-
ployer's objective is to deter an employee from repeating a certain error
by imposing one penalty and threatening to impose a more serious one
in the future.4° Where the employee's conduct indicates that rehabilita-
tion is impossible, specific deterrence will be ineffective. In such cases,
the employer will discharge the employee, having determined that he is
incorrigible. 41
Both the rehabilitation and specific deterrence objectives reflect the
employer's attempt to predict an employee's future performance on the
basis of past performance. If the employee's past performance indicates
that he could do satisfactory work in the future, some discipline short of
discharge is appropriate. If, on the other hand, the employee's prior con-
duct indicates an inability to fulfill the essential elements of the job, ter-
mination may be the appropriate decision.
38. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 321, 323 (1983) (Dobry, Arb.); Alexan-
der, Concepts of Industrial Discipline-Discussion, 9 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 76, 80 (1956) (costs
to employer will vary with labor market for skills required).
39. See Montague Mach. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 172, 175 (1982) (Bornstein, Arb.); Standard
Shade Roller Div., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 86, 90 (undated) (Dawson, Arb.); Southwest Elec. Co., 54
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 195, 196 (1969) (Bothwell, Arb.); Whitewater Elecs., 36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1442,
1446 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.). See generally Alexander, supra note 38, at 79-80.
40. Some cases illustrating the use of discipline for specific deterrence are Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1122, 1127 (1982) (Garnholz, Arb.), and Alfredo Mfg., 66 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1005, 1011 (1976) (Helfeld, Arb.).
41. See, eg., United Elec. Supply Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921, 926 (1984) (Madden, Arb.);
Apcoa, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 449,452 (1983) (Hewitt, Arb.); Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 81
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297, 306 (1983) (Gaunt, Arb.); Koenig Iron Works, 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 594, 597
(1969) (Ray, Arb.).
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For example, consider the employee who has been adequately
trained and counselled, but nevertheless accumulates a record of substan-
dard performance. At some point, a reasonable observer would conclude
that the employee has proven himself unable to meet the basic require-
ments of his job. Similarly, an employee who continues to attend work
erratically, after receiving warnings and suspensions, demonstrates his
inability or unwillingness to fulfill a critical part of his job. In both in-
stances, the employee's past performance determines management's pre-
diction about future performance. 42
Past performance is not always an accurate predictor. Even when it
is not, discipline may nevertheless be justified. Management establishes
formal and informal work rules to guide the conduct of employees while
they are on the employer's premises. 43 In every large group of workers,
there are some individuals who will inhibit productivity. The possibili-
ties are almost endless: physical disruption, negligence, theft, intoxica-
tion, and so on. Management may decide to discipline an employee who
violates a work rule even if there is no reason to believe it will happen
again. In that case, management's objective is to protect the integrity of
its rules by general deterrence, that is, by making an example of one
employee in order to keep others from breaking the rules.44 Once again,
management's decision looks to the future, but in this case it is the future
conduct of other employees that is of primary concern.
The legitimacy of a decision to discipline an employee for the pur-
pose of general deterrence depends upon the importance of the em-
ployer's interest protected by the rule, and upon the necessity of
discipline to deter others from similar misconduct. Take the case of an
employee subject to unusual stress who strikes his foreman. The protec-
tion of supervisors is critical in any workplace; fear of physical reprisal
must not inhibit supervisors from assigning work, enforcing rules, and
disciplining employees. As a result, most arbitrators would sustain a dis-
charge for this offense on general deterrence grounds, even though it was
42. See McGraw-Edison, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 403, 408 (1983) (Role, Arb.); Safeway Stores, 79
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 742, 748-49 (1982) (MacLean, Arb.); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
203, 210 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.).
43. Georgia Kraft Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 222, 225 (1978) (Spritzer, Arb.) ("It is widely
accepted in the field of industrial relations and labor arbitration that a company may legitimately
promulgate rules governing ... the conduct of its employees while on the job."); Ford Motor Co., 3
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779, 781 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.). See generally A. GOULDNER, PATrERNS OF
INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 163, 179 (1954).
44. See Zia Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 640, 642 (1984) (Daughton, Arb.) (without discharging
the grievant it would be "impossible. . . to enforce Company policy toward any other employee");
Food Giant Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 833, 834 (1982) (Dallas, Arb.) (it would be "suicide" not to
enforce anti-theft rule with discharge); Reiter Foods, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 526, 529 (1981) (Hanes,
Arb.) (severe discipline will deter others).
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shown that the employee would be unlikely to repeat the misconduct.45
Thus, "[e]ven if there is no substantial risk that the grievant would slug
his boss a second time, reinstatement might well entail so much embar-
rassment, resentment, and strain as to be impracticable."' 46 Violation of
less critical rules, in contrast, would not justify discharge for general
deterrence.
The final purpose for which management may discipline an em-
ployee, protection of profitability, is something of a catch-all. Certain
employee conduct, though not prohibited by a specific rule, may still in-
terfere with the employer's operation of the enterprise. For instance, em-
ployees can mar a carefully nurtured public image and can harm
relationships with customers or suppliers.47 Discipline up to and includ-
ing dismissal might be appropriate even when it cannot be directly tied to
motives of rehabilitation or deterrence. The largest category of employee
conduct falling under this third objective involves off-duty activity.
The generally accepted rule is that an employer may not discipline
an employee for off-duty conduct unless the conduct can be shown to
harm the employer.48 A few examples will illustrate the rule. Suppose a
day-care worker molests a child during his off-duty hours and, following
conviction, is placed on probation. Continued employment of the worker
would obviously discourage customers. A discharge would almost cer-
tainly be upheld, even though no work rule was violated, the employee's
work was otherwise satisfactory, and criminal prosecution alone was a
sufficient deterrent for this employee. 49 Other examples include the bank
officer whose pre-employment conviction for embezzling a client's funds
suddenly comes to light,50 and the employee who is convicted of drug
45. See Freeman United Coal Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861, 866 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.) (dis-
charge warranted "as a deterrent to insure that it will never happen again"); Allied Aviation Serv.
Int'l, 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 441, 443 (1973) (Turkus, Arb.); Wheland Foundry Div., 54 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 259, 260 (1970) (Hon, Arb.).
46. Ross, Discussion, 17 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 144, 151 (1964).
47. See Regional Transp. Dist., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1225, 1233-34 (1983) (Eaton, Arb.);
Hughes Air Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 148, 157 (1979) (Barsamian, Arb.).
48. See Joy Mfg. Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 697, 701 (1977) (Freeman, Arb.); General Tire
Serv., 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1279, 1281-82 (1969) (Todd, Arb.); W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 434, 436-47 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.).
49. See Dodds Livorno Am. High School, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 761, 766 (1983) (Zack, Arb.)
(alleged homosexual conduct with a student); Social Security Admin., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 725, 728
(1983) (Lubic, Arb.) (alleged sexual activity with minor child).
50. Cf Gold Kist, Inc., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 569, 575 (1981) (Statham, Arb.) ("a fraudulent
entry of a material fact" on an employment application "willfully made to deceive the employer vests
in the employer the right to terminate the employee").
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dealing during off-duty hours.5 1 These situations call for the most care-
ful evaluation by management in order to avoid overreaction and reliance
on unfounded fears, but the employer's legitimate interest in avoiding
harm to business relationships is entitled to protection.
The just cause standard precludes one common objective for disci-
pline-retribution. Management may not discipline an employee merely
to punish him for his transgressions. Indeed, it has no economic interest
in doing so. Individual managers may desire retribution, but a business
entity has no legitimate interest beyond productivity and profitability.
All of the legitimate management interests in discipline are consis-
tent with the fundamental understanding. Rehabilitation and specific de-
terrence are aimed at improving the transgressing employee's work.
General deterrence serves to reinforce the work rules which all employ-
ees must observe if the business is to prosper. Finally, protection of prof-
itability justifies prohibition of conduct that harms the employer's
business relations.
IV. THE UNION'S INTERESTS
What does a union seek in a discharge or discipline case? A cynic
might argue that the union's goal is unqualified job security. Like the
extreme management ideal of unlimited discretion, such a union goal
cannot be considered legitimate; nor does it reflect true union interests.
A union cannot reasonably expect management to carry on its employ-
ment rolls someone who has breached the fundamental understanding.
A union may certainly question the extent to which a particular instance
of employee conduct may harm productivity, but it must acknowledge
that an employee's failure to meet his obligations works to the detriment
of other employees as well as the employer. In the short run, an unsatis-
factory employee simply makes the jobs of co-workers more difficult. In
the long run, continued tolerance of substandard performance will en-
danger the employer's competitive position, and that, in turn, will
threaten the wages and even the jobs of the rest of the workforce. The
economic welfare of workers and management is interdependent.5 2
51. See City of Wilkes-Barre, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33, 35-36 (1980) (Dunn, Arb.); Joy Mfg.
Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 697, 701 (1977) (Freeman, Arb.); National Steel Corp., 60 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 613, 616-17 (1973) (McDermott, Arb.).
52. See Florsheim Shoe Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705, 709 (1980) (Roberts, Arb.) (poor pro-
ductivity "would impair the Company's ability to make a profit, to grant wage increases in future
negotiations to good productive employees and, indeed, a Company's very ability to provide jobs");
see also Brown, The Shifting Distribution of the Rights to Manage, in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR
ARBITRATION 133, 140 (J. MeKelvey ed. 1948).
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The union's real interest in disciplinary matters is fairness. A union
pursues this interest in a variety of ways. First, it seeks fairness in disci-
plinary procedures. For example, employees must have actual or con-
structive notice as to their work obligations.5 3 Posted disciplinary rules
are fairly common, but even in the absence of such rules, arbitrators rea-
sonably presume that employees are aware of basic, though unwritten,
behavioral standards.54 A union also seeks fairness in the administration
of discipline. Disciplinary measures must be based on facts; management
must ascertain what actually occurred before it imposes discipline. 55
Management must also give the employee an opportunity to explain and
must allow him union representation during the investigation, if he so
requests.56 Finally, discipline should be imposed in gradually increasing
degrees.5 7 These concerns for procedural fairness might be termed "in-
dustrial due process."'58
A union will also seek procedural fairness in the arbitration process,
particularly in the allocation of the burden of proving just cause. A dis-
ciplinary grievance, like other grievances, alleges that the employer
53. Piggly Wiggly T-212, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 808, 815 (1983) (Nelson, Arb.) (employees must
"be put on clear notice as to exactly what they are doing that is inappropriate or unacceptable, and
warned that if that inappropriate or unacceptable behavior continues, discipline and/or discharge
will result"); see New Castle State Hosp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585, 590 (1981) (Deitsch, Arb.)
(employer has responsibility to the employees to develop "unequivocal and understandable rules and
regulations"); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 994, 997 (1981) (Koven, Arb.); Stella D'Oro
Biscuit Co., 48 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 349, 350 (1967) (Calm, Arb.).
54. See Freeman United Coal Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861, 865-66 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.) (no
need to post rule because employees should know that operating machinery while intoxicated is
dangerous and will subject them to discipline); Holiday Inns, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 597, 601 (1984)
(Concepcion, Arb.) (leaving a burning candle concealed in a narrow space containing paper and
wood debris, although not forbidden by any promulgated rule, was careless and dangerous, and
justified discharge of maintenance engineer); University of Cal., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1032, 1037
(1982) (Ross, Arb.) (even without knowledge of written policy, common sense should dictate to
employee that it was improper to arrange for employer to purchase services from firm in which
employee's husband had a business interest without disclosing such interest).
55. See, eg., Great Midwest Mining Corp., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 52, 55-66 (1984) (Mikrut,
Arb.); American Bakeries Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 530, 534 (1981) (Modjeska, Arb.) (failure to
investigate violates "basic notions of fairness and due process"); McGraw-Edison Serv., 76 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1003, 1005 (1981) (Kelliher, Arb.); Gulf Printing Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1174, 1179
(1974) (Lilly, Arb.).
56. See Associated Grocers of Clo., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414, 418 (1984) (Smith, Arb.) (com-
pany was remiss in failing to give grievant an opportunity to be heard prior to discharge).
57. See Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 829, 835 (1983)
(Singer, Arb.); Montague Mach. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 172, 175-76 (1982) (Bornstein, Arb.);
United Tel. Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1246, 1253 (1972) (Seinsheimer, Arb.).
58. See Mor-Fig, Mor-Flo Indus., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 889, 893 (1981) (Nigro, Arb.) ("A
fundamental due process requirement in discipline for just cause is that the employee be treated
fairly."); see also Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration,
13 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1961); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, 11 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. I
(1958).
DUKE LAWJOURNAL
breached the collective bargaining agreement. Although the burden of
proof usually rests with the party asserting the breach, the union will
seek to shift the burden of proof to management when the case involves
discipline. The fundamental understanding, as amended by the collective
agreement, provides for continued employment unless there is just cause
for discipline. Management, in the union's view, thus bears the burden
of demonstrating just cause. 59 It has singled out an individual employee
for disciplinary action or termination, it knows why it took the action,
and for that reason it should bear the burden of explaining why discipline
is justified.
The second way in which a union seeks "fairness" in discipline is
through consistent treatment of similar cases. For example, if one em-
ployee is not punished for certain conduct, co-workers who engage in the
same conduct should be treated in the same manner. Like cases should
be treated alike.60 In a disciplinary situation, a union seeks what might
be termed "industrial equal protection."
Finally, a union seeks "fairness" for the disciplined individual by
compelling management to consider mitigating factors.61 Perhaps the
most important of these is the employee's work record. 62 For any given
offense, an employee with a long record of excellent work and no prior
discipline should be treated more leniently than a junior employee with a
history of unsatisfactory work and several prior offenses. 63 Other miti-
gating factors may be tied to the particular offense. If two employees
have been fighting, the aggressor deserves more severe discipline than the
victim. 64 In appropriate cases, an employee's attitude, demeanor, and
59. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 254 (2d ed.
1983).
60. See Western Paper Box, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 921 (1983) (Concepcion, Arb.); Transit
Management, Inc., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845, 849 (1981) (Foster, Smith, Warlick, Arbs.); Visador
Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 578, 579 (1979) (Seifer, Arb.).
61. See, eg., Southwest Detroit Hosp., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 491, 492 (1984) (Ellman, Arb.);
Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 31, 33-35 (1983) (Miller, Arb.); Safeway Stores, 79
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 742, 746-47 (1982) (MacLean, Arb.); County of Monroe, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 541,
543 (1979) (Markowitz, Arb.); Georgia Kraft Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 222, 227 (1978) (Spritzer,
Arb.).
62. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 864, 865 (1983) (White, Arb.); Dayton
Power & Light Co., 80 Lob. Arb. (BNA) 19, 21-22 (1982) (Heinsz, Arb.). See generally Labig,
Helburn & Rodgers, Discipline History, Seniority, and Reason for Discharge as Predictors of Post-
Reinstatement Job Performance, 40 ARB. J., Sept. 1985, at 44 (good pre-discharge discipline record is
a reliable predictor of good job performance after reinstatement).
63. See Montague Mach. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 172, 176 (1982) (Bornstein, Arb.).
64. See Transportation Labor Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1249, 1250 (1981) (Sheehan, Arb.);
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1057, 1058 (1979) (Herring, Arb.).
[Vol. 1985:594
THEORY OF "JUST CAUSE"
other personal factors might warrant mitigation of the penalty. 65 The
union thus seeks fairness through individualized treatment.
This third goal initially may appear to conflict with the union's in-
terest in equal protection. The two objectives, however, are compatible.
Like cases should be treated alike, but different cases should be treated
differently. The just cause standard requires reasonable discipline in each
case; it does not require that each category of offense carry a single
mandatory penalty.
Reconciling the goals of equal protection and individualized treat-
ment is not always easy. A union may argue one day that an employee
deserves leniency because of his seniority or his personal problems. The
very next day, however, the union may argue that another employee,
unable to show these mitigating factors, should be treated no more
harshly than the first employee. Although such union advocacy is to be
expected, the arbitrator should reject this argument. An employer may
and should consider relevant individual factors before imposing disci-
pline. As long as the employer uses relevant distinctions and applies
them consistently, the resulting differences in discipline should not be
disturbed.
In sum, a union seeks disciplinary "fairness" in three ways: (1) in-
dustrial due process, (2) industrial equal protection, and (3) individual-
ized treatment achieved through consideration of specific mitigating
factors. These objectives are consistent with the fundamental under-
standing, as amended in the collective bargaining agreement; the em-
ployee's expectation is that he will not be disciplined if his work and
conduct are satisfactory. Industrial due process guarantees an accurate
evaluation of his work and conduct. Industrial equal protection guaran-
tees that the definition of "satisfactory" work will be fixed at a certain
standard-a relatively stable reference point by which an employee can
plan his behavior. Individualized treatment ensures that special circum-
stances making the usual standards inappropriate will be given due
consideration.
Thus both management and union interests in discipline are consis-
tent with the fundamental understanding. The next question is whether
the interests are consistent with each other. If so, a theory of just cause
premised on the fundamental understanding can be developed and ap-
plied, without sacrificing the objectives of either party.
65. See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 267, 273-74 (1982) (Newmark,
Arb.); Oolite Indus., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 838, 845 (1981) (Greene, Arb.).
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V. THE CONGRUENCE OF MANAGEMENT AND UNION INTERESTS
The legitimate interests of management and labor in discipline and
discharge cases are reconcilable. Using the fundamental understanding,
it is possible to develop a theory of just cause that is consistent with the
interests of both parties.
Management can have little objection to a fair and consistent system
of discipline. Similarly, a union has no cause to object to disciplinary
actions occasioned by employee conduct that significantly interferes with
management's legitimate concern for production. Although the parties
may differ as to whether a particular disciplinary system is fair or
whether a given type of behavior warrants a certain measure of disci-
pline, they can agree that the legitimate interests of management and
labor provide the standards against which management's action must be
judged.
In order to establish just cause for disciplinary action, management
must first show that its interests were significantly affected by the em-
ployee's conduct. For instance, when an employee has been discharged
for violating a work rule, management may show that the employee's
prior conduct demonstrates he is unlikely to fulfill the obligations of his
job in the future.66 Alternatively, management may show that even
though the employee is unlikely to repeat the wrongful conduct, it is
important to deter other employees from such conduct and that dis-
charge is the only effective form of deterrence. Either of these two expla-
nations would establish a prima facie showing of just cause. In order to
rebut this showing of just cause, a union must prove that management
failed to give the employee industrial due process or industrial equal pro-
tection, or failed to consider mitigating factors. For example, the union
may show that management took disciplinary action without adequate
investigation, or singled out the employee for discipline when others had
been excused for the same conduct, or ignored mitigating circumstances
such as illness or provocation.
Union and management interests are fundamentally congruent,
though it may not seem so to the parties. Management's objective of
productive efficiency is served by industrial due process. For example, it
is in the employer's interest to give employees adequate notice of their
obligations. If a company wants employees to meet their performance
obligations, it must, at the very least, let them know what those obliga-
tions are. Similarly, management's objective of productive efficiency is
served by investigating the facts of a case before imposing discipline. A
66. In the case of a second or third violation, the mere fact of prior discipline may establish
significant doubt about future satisfactory work.
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wrongful accusation undermines the integrity of the disciplinary system,
creates resentment, and, in a discharge case, deprives management of a
satisfactory employee, while imposing on it the costs of obtaining and
training a replacement. Just as employees must know that when they
fulfill their obligations they will not be disciplined, employees must also
know that when they fail, they will be disciplined-but proportionately
and equally. Thus, management benefits by responding to the union's
interest in industrial due process.
Management also benefits from industrial equal protection. If like
cases are not treated alike, employees will be confused as to the gov-
erning standards or misled into believing that substandard conduct will
be tolerated.
Management's desire for efficiency is also congruent with the
union's interest in individualized treatment of employees through consid-
eration of mitigating circumstances. This congruency, however, is not
obvious. The consideration of mitigating circumstances does not detract
from management's interest in productive efficiency. For example, con-
sider the employee fired for poor attendance. Though his recent attend-
ance violates standards, his long and productive work record may
indicate that he is capable of performing the essential responsibilities of
his job in the future and that his wrongful conduct was atypical. In such
a case, management's interest in productive efficiency might actually be
furthered by retention of the employee combined with efforts to cure the
problem. On the other hand, consider the employee who is fired for
striking his supervisor, a "mortal sin" in the workplace. In such a case, a
long and satisfactory work record should not mitigate his discharge. The
broken rule is so important that firing even a senior employee can be
justified as a necessary deterrent for other workers.
VI. A THEORY OF JUST CAUSE
The legitimate interests of management and labor regarding disci-
pline are consistent both with the fundamental understanding and with
each other. From this congruence, a theory of just cause can be derived,
a theory which accommodates the parties' needs and reflects their mutual
understanding.
A. Just cause for discipline exists only when an employee has failed to
meet his obligations under the fundamental understanding of the
employment relationship. The employee's general obligation is to
provide satisfactory work. Satisfactory work has four components:
1. Regular attendance.
2. Obedience to reasonable work rules.
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3. A reasonable quality and quantity of work.
4. Avoidance of conduct, either at or away from work, which
would interfere with the employer's ability to carry on the busi-
ness effectively.
B. For there to be just cause, the discipline must further one or more of
management's three legitimate interests:
1. Rehabilitation of a potentially satisfactory employee.
2. Deterrence of similar conduct, either by the disciplined em-
ployee or by other employees.
3. Protection of the employer's ability to operate the business
successfully.
C. The concept of just cause includes certain employee protections that
reflect the union's interest in guaranteeing "fairness" in disciplinary
situations.
1. The employee is entitled to industrial due process. This
includes:
a. actual or constructive notice of expected standards of con-
duct and penalties for wrongful conduct;
b. a decision based on facts, determined after an investigation
that provides the employee an opportunity to state his case,
with union assistance if he desires it;
c. the imposition of discipline in gradually increasing degrees,
except in cases involving the most extreme breaches of the
fundamental understanding. In particular, discharge may
be imposed only when less severe penalties will not protect
legitimate management interests, for one of the following
reasons: (1) the employee's past record shows that the un-
satisfactory conduct will continue, (2) the most stringent
form of discipline is needed to protect the system of work
rules, or (3) continued employment would inevitably inter-
fere with the successful operation of the business; and
d. proof by management that just cause exists.
2. The employee is entitled to industrial equal protection, which
requires like treatment of like cases.
3. The employee is entitled to individualized treatment. Distinc-
tive facts in the employee's record or regarding the reason for
discipline must be given appropriate weight.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF JUST CAUSE
While labor arbitrators frequently decide discharge and discipline
cases, they rarely discuss the concept of just cause in other than con-
[Vol. 1985:594
THEORY OF "JUST CAUSE"
clusory terms. 67 Even so, most arbitration awards in reported discipline
decisions can be explained by this article's theory of just cause. Devia-
tions from the theory probably result from the fact that there has been
little systematic evaluation of the nature of just cause. The following
examples illustrate the theory of just cause.
A. Determination of "Satisfactory" Work
Illustration 1: Regular Attendance. One of an employee's primary
responsibilities is to report to work in a timely fashion. If an employee
fails to fulfill this obligation, discipline may be imposed. Continual tardi-
ness or absenteeism may justify discharge.
For example, consider the case of an employee who had been tardy
or absent eleven times during a fourteen month period. After a few ab-
sences, management discussed the problem with the employee. Further
absences resulted in a letter of warning. As a result of continued ab-
sences, the employer imposed a three-day suspension, followed by a ten-
day suspension. Finally, the company fired the employee. The arbitrator
held that the discharge was justified, characterizing the employee's at-
tendance record as "dismal" and the company's attendance policy as
necessary to maintaining the efficiency of its operations. 68
The obligation of regular attendance is not absolute, however.
Where absences are for a good reason, and the reason no longer exists,
the likely prospect of regular attendance in the future may make dis-
charge unreasonable. In a recent case, an employee's absenteeism, which
was primarily the result of an industrial injury and a gunshot wound,
initially had been considered excused by the company. Management
later decided to discharge the employee, claiming that his absences were
excessive. Because there was no evidence that the injury, though long-
term, would prevent the employee from meeting his attendance obliga-
tions in the future, the arbitrator sustained the employee's grievance. 69
The legitimacy of discipline for unsatisfactory attendance turns
largely on a prediction of the employee's future conduct. A few isolated
67. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
68. Gulf Oil Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128, 131 (1977) (Drotning, Arb.); see also Angelus Sani-
tary Can Mach. Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 973, 976 (1977) (Ashe, Arb.) (dismissal upheld because
employee was absent more than other employees, the absences had an adverse effect on company
efficiency, and the company counseled the employee and used progressive discipline); North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 178, 180-81 (1969) (Volz, Arb.) (dismissal upheld where em-
ployee was repeatedly warned about absenteeism, but continued to act indifferently).
69. Oglebay Norton Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 652, 654-55 (1984) (Duda, Arb.); see also Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 203, 210 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.) (evidence insufficient to pre-
dict that employee was unable to work in the future).
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incidents of absenteeism simply do not establish the facts necessary to
predict continued problems, nor does a pattern of absenteeism based
upon a condition that is unlikely to recur, such as an industrial injury. A
pattern of absenteeism based upon a condition, such as an industrial in-
jury, that is unlikely to recur, also will not support a prediction of future
absences. However, when the evidence demonstrates that excessive ab-
senteeism is likely to continue in the future, the employer has shown a
breach of the employee's obligation to provide "satisfactory" work.
Illustration 2: Observance of Reasonable Work Rules. Work rules
regulate employee conduct in order to maximize both the safety of other
employees and the productivity of the company. Breach of reasonable
work rules is thus a legitimate ground for discipline.
In one case, an employee was discharged following a fight that be-
gan as simple bantering and ended with a knifing. The company, whose
rules prohibited fighting on the premises, disagreed with the union's
characterization of the event as mere horseplay. The arbitrator upheld
the firing, stating that certain standards of conduct must be maintained
in the workplace.70 If the employer could not discipline employees for
such infractions, it would be impossible to maintain the minimum order
needed for protection of other employees and for productivity.
In a second case, an employee was discharged for violating a chemi-
cal manufacturer's rule prohibiting smoking in designated "no smoking"
areas. The arbitrator stated that the company had a legitimate interest in
limiting smoking to certain specified areas-indeed, it was "imperative"
that management restrict this conduct. Individual employees could not
be allowed to weigh for themselves the risks and advantages of smoking
in designated "no smoking" areas.71
Observance of reasonable work rules is necessary to ensure the satis-
factory work to which the employer is entitled under the fundamental
understanding. Of course, even when a work rule is valid, management
must establish that the rule was violated by the disciplined employee.
For example, an employee who was fired for being rude to customers was
reinstated when management could present no witnesses with first-hand
70. Eagle Ottawa Leather Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 493, 494 (1984) (Jason, Arb.); see also
Russer Foods, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 305, 306 (1980) (Grant, Arb.) (just cause existed for dismissing
employee for horseplay that involved setting fires on company property); Kroger Co., 75 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 290, 292 (1980) (Berns, Arb.) (just cause existed for dismissing employee who set fire to co-
worker's apron).
71. Olin Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 644, 647 (1983) (Nicholas, Arb.). But cf Converters Ink,
68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 593, 596 (1977) (Sembower, Arb.) (mitigating circumstances in favor of em-
ployee may be considered where lighting of cigarette was involuntary, with no scienter on employee's
part).
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knowledge of the alleged incidents.72 Had the employer presented the
arbitrator with adequate proof of a breach, discipline would certainly
have been warranted.
Illustration 3: Reasonable Quantity and Quality of Work An em-
ployee is hired to produce a reasonable quantity of work at an expected
level of quality. When an employee does not fulfill his obligation to pro-
duce "satisfactory" work, he may be subject to discipline and, ultimately,
to discharge.73 At times, an employee may be physically incapable of
performing assigned work; this is not normally considered an occasion
for "discipline," because the employee may not be at fault for his condi-
tion. Nonetheless, the just cause standard applies, and satisfactory work
must be produced.
What is "satisfactory" work will vary from case to case. A recent
decision reveals that the definition of "satisfactory" depends on the cir-
cumstances. A discharged "Driver Salesperson's" low productivity was
the result of a temporary disability-an occupational leg injury. A com-
pany rule required driver salespersons to deliver thirty cases of soft
drinks per hour. The arbitrator concluded that this quantity standard,
while generally reasonable, was unreasonable when applied to the dis-
missed employee because his leg injury prevented him from meeting the
standard. The driver should have been required to perform only the
amount of work reasonable in light of his injury.74
Permanent or extended disabilities are another matter. An em-
ployee may become physically or psychologically incapable of perform-
ing a reasonable quantity or quality of work. If so, dismissal is justified
because an employer is entitled to a fair day's work in return for payment
of wages.75 Thus, an arbitrator correctly held that an employee who had
a chronic asthma condition, with unusual allergic sensitivity to various
industrial chemical fumes, was rightfully discharged because he could no
72. Dyer's Chop House, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 198, 202 (1984) (Ray, Arb.); see also Excelsior
Truck Leasing Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 470, 472 (1978) (Votaw, Arb.).
73. In one case, a company fired a lathe operator who consistently failed to meet established
production standards after he had received three warning notices. The arbitrator upheld the dis-
charge, concluding that the quantity and quality of the employee's work fell below that reasonably
expected by the company. General Elec. Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 578, 580 (1980) (Schor, Arb.); see
also Mobay Chem. Corp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 219, 221-22 (1981) (Lubow, Arb.).
74. Universal Foods Corp., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 105, 112 (1984) (Belcher, Arb.); see also Price
Pfister Brass Mfg. Co., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 89, 93 (1974) (Fellman, Arb.) (unreasonable for em-
ployer to insist that employee continue to operate certain machines after she was injured). Of
course, an employer can lay off an employee who is unable to produce a satisfactory quantity of
work.
75. Humanitarian concerns may justify payments from the public treasury or from social insur-
ance programs, but they do not require an employer to continue paying an unproductive worker.
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longer perform his job adequately.76 Similarly, the discharge of an epilep-
tic employee was held to be justified because continued employment
would have endangered other employees. 77 Discharge in such cases is
not for rehabilitation or deterrence. It can be explained only by reference
to the fundamental understanding.
Management may discipline or terminate employees in its pursuit of
productivity. Poor work performance warrants discipline if the stan-
dards used to evaluate that performance are reasonable. An employee
may be fired when he fails to correct his work performance after progres-
sive discipline or may be terminated when he becomes physically or psy-
chologically incapable of performing his assigned work. In those
instances, the employer can justify dismissal by showing that the em-
ployee will be unable to meet his obligation to produce a reasonable
quantity and quality of work.
Illustration 4: Avoidance of Conduct Interfering with the Successful
Operation of the Company. Employee misconduct away from the work-
place may result in discipline if management can prove that the activity
interferes with the employer's ability to carry on its business effectively.
One typical situation involves an employee who, while off-duty, commits
a crime that casts doubt upon his ability to continue to perform his job
adequately. Thus, a supermarket had just cause for the discharge of a
clerk who was convicted of burglarizing another store, an act that raised
serious doubt as to his future trustworthiness. 78 Some off-duty miscon-
duct will interfere with supervisory authority in the plant. For example,
an employee who assaulted the company's personnel manager at a local
restaurant was properly fired because the attack on the supervisor could
impair the manager's ability to carry out his supervisory functions in the
future.79
An employee's conduct on or off duty may tarnish the company's
reputation and jeopardize its goodwill. If so, the conduct may constitute
just cause for discipline. For example, a bus driver was fired for engaging
76. Stowe-Woodward Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1038, 1044 (1982) (Thomson, Arb.); see also
Zellerbach Paper Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 69, 72 (1977) (Stashower, Arb.) (company obligated to
employ handicapped worker only to the extent practicable).
77. Koppers Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 708, 710 (1981) (Edes, Arb.); see also Weber Mfg., 63
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 56, 59 (1974) (Yaeger, Arb.). But see Hyco Inc., 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 86, 90
(1976) (Nichols, Arb.).
78. Safeway Stores, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1293, 1296 (1980) (Doyle, Arb.); see also New York
Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 65, 66-67 (1982) (Sabghir, Arb.) (conviction for
selling methadone is just cause for dismissal).
79. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 42, 46 (1980) (Beckman, Arb.); see also
Southwestern Ill. Coal Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 806, 808 (1983) (Hewitt, Arb.); Allied Aviation
Serv., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 441, 443 (1973) (Turkus, Arb.).
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in sexual acts with a young female passenger on his bus, which was
parked on a public street in the middle of the day. His conduct certainly
jeopardized the public image of the bus company.80 Nothing in the stan-
dard collective bargaining agreement requires the employer to tolerate an
employee who does it more harm than good. In another bus company
case, a driver was discharged for his well-publicized off-duty activities as
the Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan. The company faced the pros-
pect of the serious economic loss that would result from a boycott
threatened by the outraged local community if the driver was not fired.
The arbitrator upheld the discharge because the driver's off-duty conduct
prevented him from fulfilling his job responsibilities. The threatened loss
to the employer justified the dismissal. 81 In short, the driver's off-duty
conduct directly interfered with the employer's successful operation of
the enterprise.
Arbitrators should be extremely cautious when dealing with allega-
tions of off-duty interference with the company's business. They must
insist on a showing of actual or highly probable harm, and require man-
agement to prove that the discipline imposed was proportionate to that
harm. If the employer can supply the necessary proof, discipline is ap-
propriate for the employee's failure to fulfill his part of the employment
bargain.
B. Achievement of Legitimate Management Objectives.
Illustration 5: Rehabilitation. An employer will discipline an em-
ployee in order to further its interest in obtaining satisfactory work. One
purpose of such discipline is to rehabilitate the employee and thus in-
crease his productivity. An arbitrator must consider the rehabilitation
objective when reviewing discipline under the just cause standard. As
the following two cases illustrate, however, management must show that
the degree of discipline was appropriate.
In the first case, a television station suspended a video tape editor
for one day because he failed to review completely a tape that was tele-
80. Regional Transp. Dist., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1225, 1233-34 (1983) (Eaton, Arb.); see also
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 409, 415-16 (1980) (Seibel, Arb.) (dismissal of a
telephone company employee upheld where employee, while off duty and not on company property,
made harassing and obscene calls that hurt company's business interest); NRM Corp., 51 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 177, 180-81 (1968) (Teple, Arb.) (dismissal upheld where employee had been charged with
engaging in criminal activity while not on company's premises; employee could no longer be
trusted).
81. Baltimore Transit Co., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 62, 66-67 (1966) (Duff, Arb.); see also Trail-
ways Southeastern Lines, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 712, 716 (1983) (Gibson, Arb.) (dismissal held proper
where bus driver clinically diagnosed as alcoholic engaged in felonious conduct that was reported in
newspapers; his conduct damaged employer's reputation).
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vised. The tape contained blank frames and extraneous material, and it
mismatched audio with video. The arbitrator ruled that management
could discipline the employee in order to rehabilitate him, but the less
severe penalty of a written reprimand would have been adequate to
achieve this objective. 82
In the second case, the arbitrator set aside the discharge of a mill
operator who bored a guide bearing incorrectly. Although the employee
had been verbally cautioned twice before, the company failed to consider
whether the employee could have been rehabilitated. Since his work rec-
ord indicated that rehabilitation was possible, the employee was
reinstated. 83
Illustration 6: Specific Deterrence. A second objective of discipline
is to deter the employee from repeating unsatisfactory conduct. Arbitra-
tors have routinely upheld discipline designed for specific deterrence.
Thus, an employer properly suspended an employee who disregarded or-
ders to stop reading on the job and refused to perform a certain assign-
ment.84 Another employer was allowed to discipline an employee who
continued to produce work below reasonable production levels.85 A
third employer properly suspended an employee for five days after he
was discovered painting a friend's house on the day he called in sick.
86
In each of these cases, discipline was intended to deter the employee
from similar misconduct and was a reasonable means of achieving that
objective. The reasonableness of discipline in these cases is important. If
the discipline is not proportional to the offense or is substantially more
severe than needed for deterrence, an arbitrator might reduce the
discipline. 87
Illustration 7.- General Deterrence. In some situations, an em-
ployer may discipline an employee in order to set an example for other
workers. Discipline, in other words, may be intended to show that the
82. Post-Newsweek Stations, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 386, 389 (1984) (Daniel, Arb.).
83. Montague Mach. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 172, 176 (1982) (Bornstein, Arb.); see also
Canron, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1310, 1312-13 (1979) (Marcus, Arb.) (dismissal was unfair and
the employee was reinstated where employee received only general warnings, and violations were
minor).
84. Library of Congress, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1092, 1100 (1979) (Aronin, Arb.); see also Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 405, 407-08 (1979) (Craver, Arb.).
85. Lash Distrib., Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 274, 278 (1980) (Darrow, Arb.); see also Wallace-
Murray Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 385, 387 (1979) (Seifer, Arb.); Crosby Group, 72 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 787, 788 (1979) (Davis, Arb.).
86. City of Appleton, 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 342, 345 (1974) (Lee, Arb.).
87. See, eg., Boise Cascade Corp., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 175, 179 (1984) (Gallagher, Arb.); City
of Detroit, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1049, 1054-55 (1984) (Roumell, Arb.); Post-Newsweek Stations, 82
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 386, 389-90 (1984) (Daniel, Arb.).
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misconduct will not be tolerated. To achieve this objective, it may be
necessary to dismiss an employee even if that employee is not likely to
commit similar acts in the future. Some conduct is so serious that ex-
treme measures may be used to discourage others from such activities.
In one such case, an employee struck his supervisor without provo-
cation and threatened to "cut the throat" of the plant manager. Because
the conduct, if repeated by other employees, would obviously hamper
managers in carrying out their essential functions, the employee's dis-
charge was upheld. 88 The arbitrator noted that the harm caused by the
employee "need not be measured in medical bills or blood."' 89 In a sec-
ond case, an airport cleaning service fired an employee who threatened to
blow up an airplane. The arbitrator upheld the company's action on the
ground that the company could not afford to condone such egregious
conduct. 90
Illustration 8. Protection of the Ability to Operate a Business Success-
fully-Business Reputation. There are circumstances when an em-
ployer may discipline or discharge an employee in order to protect
management's ability to operate the enterprise successfully and thereby
enforce the employee's obligation to provide satisfactory work.91 A few
further examples will suffice.
A bus company fired a driver who pled guilty to criminal charges of
breaking and entering into his estranged wife's house with intent to com-
mit murder. The arbitrator upheld the discharge, noting that the press
coverage, which identified the driver as an employee of the bus company,
clearly damaged the employer's business reputation.92 Proof of actual
harm is essential. Thus, when an employer fired an employee for selling
marijuana to an undercover agent, the arbitrator ruled that the discharge
was unjustified because the company failed to prove that its reputation
was injured by the incident.93 Although a company may discipline an
88. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 42, 46 (1980) (Beckman, Arb.); see also
ITT Continental Baking Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 764, 768-70 (1980) (Flagler, Arb.) (upholding
discharge of employee who verbally abused supervisor and sprayed supervisor with high pressure
water hose); Central Soya Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1084, 1090 (1980) (Cantor, Arb.) (upholding
discharge of employee who threatened to kill foreman).
89. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 42, 46 (1980) (Beckman, Arb.).
90. Allied Aviation Serv., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 455, 458 (1981) (Turkus, Arb.); see also Ralston
Purina Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 313, 321 (1980) (Brown, Arb.) (upholding firing of employee who
phoned bomb threat).
91. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
92. Trailways Southeastern Lines, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 712, 716 (1983) (Gibson, Arb.).
93. Vulcan Asphalt Ref. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1311, 1313 (1982) (Welch, Arb.); see also
Maust Transfer Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 780, 783 (1982) (Lacugna, Arb.) (employee's off-duty
dishonesty did not seriously injure employer).
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employee in order to protect its ability to operate its business success-
fully, it must establish that its business interests have been harmed by the
employee's off-duty conduct.
C. Assurance of "Fairness."
Illustration 9: Industrial Due Process. Our theory of just cause
recognizes that the union seeks to ensure fairness in disciplinary matters.
The following examples illustrate one way a union seeks to guarantee
fairness-by insisting on certain procedural prerequisites to discipline.
These requirements form the concept of "industrial due process."
Management must adequately investigate an incident prior to decid-
ing whether to discipline an employee. Failure to do so may taint the
disciplinary decision. For example, when a company fired an employee
for stealing money from a supervisor's car after hearing only the supervi-
sor's version of what occurred, an arbitrator held that failure to obtain
the employee's version of the story violated basic notions of fairness and
due process. Management cannot act first and only later determine
whether the employee deserved the discipline. 94
Due process also means that the discipline imposed must be conso-
nant with the wrongful conduct. In many situations, such as those in-
volving absenteeism and poor work performance, management must
impose discipline in gradually increasing degrees. Sudden imposition of
the maximum penalty is often unwarranted. In such a case, an arbitrator
is likely to reduce the penalty. For example, an arbitrator ruled that
management wrongly fired a crane operator for carelessly leaving a steel
plate suspended. The employee had received no prior discipline that
might have indicated a pattern of carelessness. Although the employee's
act was certainly not blameless, the arbitrator returned him to active
duty, but without back pay. 95
When management has tried several times to remedy a problem
with minor discipline, a final decision to discharge the repeat offender
can be quite reasonable. In such a case, a bus driver was fired for care-
lessly colliding with another vehicle owned by the bus company. Over a
period of years, the employee had been involved in a series of preventable
accidents for which he had been warned and suspended. The arbitrator
94. See American Bakeries Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 530, 534 (1981) (Modjeska, Arb.); see also
Associated Grocers of Colo., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414, 419-20 (1984) (Smith, Arb.).
95. Production Steel Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 229, 232 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.); see also
Canron, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1310, 1313 (1979) (Marcus, Arb.) (penalty reduced from dis-
charge to one month suspension where employer failed to give employee clear and specific warning
that he was producing unacceptable number of defective welds).
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upheld the discharge, stating that the company "extended its efforts at
fairness, understanding, and assistance far beyond the point a reasonable
mind might anticipate."' 96
Illustration 10: Industrial Equal Protection. A union also has an
interest in consistent application of discipline. Management must treat
like cases alike. If the union can demonstrate that an employee was
treated more harshly than similarly situated employees, the arbitrator
will likely sustain the grievance.
In one case, an employer fired an employee for having beer on the
company's premises in violation of a rule strictly prohibiting such con-
duct. The company had been lax in its enforcement of this rule and had
excused other violations. Although finding the rule reasonable, the arbi-
trator sustained the grievance because it had not been consistently en-
forced. 97 In another case, an employer dismissed an employee who had
been progressively disciplined for poor attendance without noticeable im-
provement. The employee's final absence, the "last straw," was due to
sickness. The union argued that the company had regularly accepted
illness as a valid excuse for absence, but the evidence failed to support its
claim. The arbitrator upheld the company's action.98 Had the union
been able to document its position, the discharge might well have been
overturned. 99
Illustration 11: Individualized Treatment. The final way in which
a union seeks fairness in discipline is by insisting on the consideration of
mitigating factors. Normally in a discharge case the dismissed em-
ployee's entire work record will be examined. A long and satisfactory
record may cause an arbitrator to reduce the level of discipline imposed.
For example, in one case, a public utility fired an employee who had
sexually harassed a fellow employee in violation of the employer's work
rules. The arbitrator stressed the seriousness of the misconduct, but after
considering the employee's twenty-eight year service record, he con-
cluded that the discharge should be reduced to a seven-month suspen-
96. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 829, 835 (1983) (Singer,
Arb.).
97. Western Paper Box, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 921 (1983) (Concepcion, Arb.); see also
Visador Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 578, 579-80 (1979) (Seifer, Arb.); Shenango, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 869, 870 (1976) (Cahn, Arb.).
98. Stokely Van Camp, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677, 680 (1983) (Schaffer, Arb.).
99. A bald claim of prior condonation of similar misconduct will not establish disparate treat-
ment. The union must present proof that similar misconduct has been excused or treated more
leniently. When such proof is presented, the discipline may not stand. See, e.g., Carnation Co., 3
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (84 Lab. Arb.) 80, 84 (Jan. 7, 1985) (Wright, Arb.); Shenango, Inc., 67 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 869, 869-70 (1976) (Cahn, Arb.).
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sion. '° In the usual case involving the discharge of an employee for
fighting with a co-worker, "[m]any years of seniority alone will not save
his job."101 However, in a case where an employee involved in a fight
had eighteen years seniority, a satisfactory work record, and, at age fifty-
seven, no reasonable opportunity to obtain other employment in his
town, an arbitrator ordered his reinstatement on six months probation,
but without back pay.102
In absenteeism cases, unions will often try to explain the employee's
attendance problems, introducing evidence of alcoholism,10 3 family ill-
ness, a0 4 or a personal illness that has since been cured.105 Such facts may
show that the employee's poor attendance record is not an accurate pre-
dictor of his ability or willingness to meet his attendance obligations in
the future. A penalty less severe than discharge might then be
warranted.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When the parties to a collective bargaining agreement adopt the
standard of just cause, they expect that an arbitrator will apply the prin-
ciple in the manner they intend. Unfortunately, the parties rarely explain
their intentions in any detail. By examining the interests of the parties in
a discipline case, an arbitrator can make sound judgments about the
probable expectations of the parties. The common adherence of labor
and management to general principles of fairness, efficiency, rehabilita-
tion, and deterrence, indicates that both wish the disciplinary system to
accomplish similar objectives.
This article has presented a systematic model of just cause, one that
will guide the parties in their day-to-day activity and help an arbitrator
resolve disciplinary grievances. Using the fundamental understanding of
the employment relationship, as amended in the collective bargaining
agreement, the model describes the components of the employee's obliga-
tion to provide satisfactory work and lists management's legitimate
100. Dayton Power & Light Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 19, 21-22 (1982) (Heinsz, Arb.); see also
Capital Dist. Transp. Auth., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1313, 1318 (1979) (Cutler, Arb.) (reinstatement
ordered in light of grievant's confused report concerning alleged sexual harassment and in light of
employee's 17-year service record).
101. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 37 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 704, 706 (1961) (McCoy, Arb.).
102. R.J. Tower Corp., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1160, 1163-66 (1977) (Roumell, Arb.).
103. See Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 31, 33 (1983) (Miller, Arb.); Warner &
Swazey Co., 71 Lab. Axb. (BNA) 158, 158-59 (1978) (Seigel, Arb.).
104. See County of Monroe, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 541, 543 (1979) (Markowitz, Arb.).
105. See Safeway Stores, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 742, 746-48 (1982) (MacLean, Arb.); see also
Union Camp Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 156, 158 (1982) (Coxe, Arb.); East Ohio Gas Co., 78 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 71, 72-73 (1982) (Michelstetter, Arb.).
[Vol. 1985:594
THEORY OF "JUST CA USE"
objectives for imposing discipline. This theory of just cause also includes
certain protections for employees that reflect the union's interest in guar-
anteeing fairness and accuracy in the application of discipline. Manage-
ment objectives and union interests are compatible in most cases because
both derive from the fundamental understanding.
This article's theory of just cause does not transform the arbitrator's
function into that of a technician, fitting evidence into tabbed slots and
reaching a mechanical solution. 106 Inevitably, resolving a discipline case
involves skilled judgment. The Supreme Court has cautioned that the
arbitrator "does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial jus-
tice," 107 but, as Professor Edgar Jones has perceptively argued, at the
end of the grievance process there is only the arbitrator's sense of justice:
Yet any arbitrator who has looked down the long corridor of his con-
science at a "just cause" disciplinary grievance is apt to feel that, at
best, it is a pious sentiment, and, at worst, that it obscures and encum-
bers the abrasive necessity of pulling all the elements of decision, in-
cluding whatever biases he may experience, down into plain view. The
parties in the "just cause" provision have conferred upon management
the discretion to discipline the employees, but only for "just cause."
Can it be said that the arbitrator does not sit to dispense his own brand
of justice in that case? At that point, what other brand could there
possibly be?' 0 8
The arbitrator's judgment can be guided by a conceptual model of
just cause, a model of the sort proposed here. Every decisionmaker must
determine the facts of a case by, for example, resolving questions of cred-
ibility. Our model recognizes that the labor arbitrator must do more
than that. He must decide whether the employee failed to provide satis-
factory work; whether the discipline furthered one of management's le-
gitimate interests; and whether the employer has provided industrial due
process, industrial equal protection, and individualized treatment. The
value of a systematic model of just cause, in short, lies not in its ability to
supply the right answers, but rather in its power to force the arbitrator to
confront the right questions.
106. See Ritzenthaler Bus Lines, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 543, 545 (1984) (Edes, Arb.) ("[J]ust
cause cannot be determined by any readily applied mechanical rule.").
107. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
108. Jones, Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Some Hypoth-
eses, 11 UCLA L. REV. 675, 764 (1964).
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